# Aus den Fehlern anderer lernen

Web Security verstehen durch Gegenbeispiele

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#### **Clemens Hübner**

Software Security Engineer @ inovex
Helps secure applications, still hacks them
Located in Munich






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# **Preliminary**

learning from the mistakes of others



fingerpointing & blaming









- 1. Broken Access Control
- 2. Cryptographic Failures
- 3. Injection
- 4. Insecure Design
- 5. Security Misconfiguration
- 6. Vulnerable and Outdated Components
- 7. Identification and Authentication Failures
- 8. Software and Data Integrity Failures
- 9. Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
- 10. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)







#### **Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)**

- DiGA Novega: Treatment of depression via web application through video/audio and interactive exercises
- Data download (required by GDPR)
  - O GET <a href="https://www.novego.com/myaccount/participant/data-export/21378">https://www.novego.com/myaccount/participant/data-export/21378</a>
  - 21378 = User ID



#### **Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)**

GET <a href="https://www.noveqo.com/myaccount/participant/export/21377">https://www.noveqo.com/myaccount/participant/export/21377</a>

- Email address
- Gender
- therapy program registered
- self-assessment results

found by

ZERFORSCHUNG

#### **GAD-7** Anxiety

Over the <u>last two weeks</u> , how often have you been bothered by the following problems?	Not at all	Several days	More than half the days	Nearly every day
Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge	0	1	2	3
Not being able to stop or control worrying	0	1	2	3
Worrying too much about different things	0	1	2	3
Trouble relaxing	0	1	2	3
Being so restless that it is hard to sit still	0	1	2	3
Becoming easily annoyed or irritable	0	1	2	3
Feeling afraid, as if something awful might happen	0	1	2	3



#### **Insecure GraphQL API**

- Grocery delivery start-ups Flink und Gorillas both use GraphQL-APIs
- GraphQL
  - Introspection: self-documented API
  - client defines return object
- Similar flaws found at Flink (03/2021) and Gorillas (05/2021)

found by





#### **Insecure GraphQL API: Flink**

- self-documented GraphQL API
  - order ( id <u>ID!</u> ) <u>Order</u>
     Look up an order by ID.
  - orders (sortBy <u>OrderSortingInput</u>, filter <u>OrderFilterInput</u>, created <u>ReportingPeriod</u>, status <u>OrderStatusFilter</u>, before <u>String</u>, after <u>String</u>, first <u>Int</u>, last <u>Int</u>) <u>OrderCountableConnection</u> <u>List of orders</u>.
  - draftOrders (sortBy <u>OrderSortingInput</u>, filter <u>OrderDraftFilterInput</u>, created <u>ReportingPeriod</u>, before <u>String</u>, after <u>String</u>, first <u>Int</u>, last <u>Int</u>
     ) <u>OrderCountableConnection</u>
     List of draft orders.



### Insecure GraphQL API: Flink

self-documented GraphQL API



# Insecure GraphQL API: Flink

self-documented GraphQL API



#### **Insecure GraphQL API: Gorillas**

```
Fields
activeOrders(
  filter: GraphFilterScalar
  feed: GraphFeedInput
): [MarketOrderData]
 Get Order Data
ordersData(
  filter: GraphFilterScalar
  feed: GraphFeedInput
): [OrderData]
 Get Order Data
tenantConfig(
  filter: GraphFilterScalar
  feed: GraphFeedInput
): [TenantConfig]
 Get Tenant Configuration Data
```


```
"completedOn": "2020-10-31
"createdOn": "2020-10-31
            "paymentGateway": "STRIPE"
    ropOff : t
"address": {
   "addressDetailInfo":
   "inates": {
                                                                                                                                               inovex
```

#### **Takeaways**

- IDOR:
  - Don't use incrementing IDs, but e.g. UUIDs
  - Don't rely on secrecy of IDs
- Insecure API:
  - GraphQL needs other Authz measures
- In general:
  - Design Authz early
  - Follow principle of least privilege
  - Deny by default
  - Test for misuse cases








#### **JWT Failures**

- JWT = JSON Web Token
- standard for JSON-Payload that is signed and/or encrypted
- often used for Authn/Authz tokens





#### Design flaws of JWT as Authn token

- Logout is impossible
  - self-contained token are valid as long they are not expired
  - logout = revocation is not possible without losing JWT's advantages
- Change of permissions/roles is hard
  - needs re-issue of token

- Good reasons JWT might be no good idea at all
  - → Stop using JWT for sessions




#### **Implementation flaws of JWTs**

- complex cryptography without secure defaults
  - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 problematic since 1998
- over-engineered standard
  - too many use cases leading to unreasonable variants

```
4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter

The "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter is the public key that corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. This key is represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK]. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
```

- flexible specification, leading to error-prone implementations
  - None-Attack
  - polyglot JWTs





# **Implementation flaws of JWTs: None-Attack**


alg allows specification of different algorithms

```
Encoded PASTE A TOKEN HERE
                                                               Decoded EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET
                                                                HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE
  eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.ey
  JzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY30DkwIiwibmFtZSI6Ikpva
                                                                   "alg": "HS256",
  G4gRG91IiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.Sf1Kx
                                                                   "typ": "JWT"
  wRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36P0k6yJV_adQssw5c
                                                                PAYLOAD: DATA
                                                                   "sub": "1234567890",
                                                                   "name": "John Doe",
                                                                   "iat": 1516239022
                                                                VERIFY SIGNATURE
                                                                 HMACSHA256(
                                                                   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
                                                                   base64UrlEncode(payload),
                                                                   your-256-bit-secret
                                                                 ) secret base64 encoded
```



#### **Implementation flaws of JWTs: None-Attack**

None is also a valid algorithm, meaning the signature is not checked






presented by **Tom Tervoort** at



### **Implementation flaws of JWTs: Polyglot JWTs**





presented by Tom Tervoort at



# **Implementation flaws of JWTs: Polyglot JWTs**

```
{
    "AAAA":".XXXX.",
    "protected": "AAAA",
    "payload": "BBBB",
    "signature": "CCCC"
}

1: JWT string


3: JWT string

Claims
    processor)

2: Validation result: ok/not okay

4: Authorization decisions
```






#### **Takeaways**

- Consider alternatives to JWT
  - use Session Token
  - use PASETO / Macaroon / Biscuits
- Use modern, patched JWT library
- Set algorithm explicitly








#### **Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS)**

 User input is contained in the application in a way allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary scripts in the victim's browser


```
<script>alert(42);</script>
```

 Affects all user controlled data, including URL parameter, request body, header and cookies
























#### XSS - Yesterday's snow?

- Modern SPA frameworks prevent XSS quite successful
- No longer a mass phenomenon
- XSS tends to be forgotten
- But: still relevant, when no framework is used



# **OAuth Solution in Hyperscaler Cloud Product...**





### **OAuth Solution in Hyperscaler Cloud Product...**

https://traceability.XXXXXX.com/.auth/login/aad?post\_login\_redirect\_uri=http%253A%252F%252Fredirect.example.org



#### **OAuth Solution in Hyperscaler Cloud Product...**

https://traceability.XXXXXXX.com/.auth/login/aad?post\_login\_redirect\_uri=%23/%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27xss%27)%3C/script%3E




#### **Takeaways**

- How are you handling XSS?
  - Modern web frameworks do it quite well
  - Don't forget it everywhere else!
- Do defense in depth
  - HttpOnly Cookies
  - Content Security Policy (CSP)
  - **(WAF)**







#### **Insecure Design: Web Race Conditions**

- exploit race conditions between security relevant process steps
  - redeeming a voucher
  - usage of one-time-token (e.g. OTP)
  - withdrawing/transferring of money
  - o identification/registration
- network latency, jitter and internal latency cause exploitable delays



### **Web Race Conditions: Bonify (2023)**

Bonify: FinTech-Startup for to assess creditworthiness of applicants

Authentication and identification via bank account

# bonify — das Schufa-Startup, das jedem sagt, ob Du kreditwürdig bist



bonify — das Schufa-Startup, das jedem sagt, ob Du kreditwürdig bist | by Lilith Wittmann



### **Web Race Conditions: Bonify (2023)**

Microservice architecture with service-to-service communication

#### Registration process:

- 1. Creation of user in user-service
- 2. Login in online banking, under supervision of banking-service
- 3. Request of name information held in banking-service by the user-service
- 4. Flagging of user as "validated"



### **Web Race Conditions: Bonify (2023)**


Microservice architecture with service-to-service communication

#### Registration process:

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Change of user's name








- Thoroughly design processes
- Take timing into account don't rely on an implicit order
  - When is state changed?
  - Can two requests change the same record?
- Consider abuse cases
- Perform threat modelling for attacker's view







#### **Security Misconfiguration: Public S3 Buckets**

Another S3 Bucket Leads to Breach of 50k Patient Records

by Dennis Sebayan on March 15, 2021

McGraw Hill's S3 buckets exposed 100,000 students' grades and personal info

ACCENTURE - EMBARRASSING DATA LEAK
BUSINESS DATA IN A PUBLIC AMAZON S3 BUCKET

SECURITY THROUGH...WHAT EXACTLY? -

Defense contractor stored intelligence data in Amazon cloud unprotected

Alibaba Victim of Huge Data Leak as China Tightens Security




- Use automated, repeatable processes to deploy environments
- Identical setups for all stages (but different secrets)
- careful configuration of all layers using best practices
- Use automated test tools / external testers



For developers: provide secure defaults





#### **Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Log4Shell**

- a zero-day vulnerability in Log4j, a Java logging framework
- allowing arbitrary code execution
- existed unnoticed since 2013, published and patched in 2021

- basic and popular framework, big impact through many transitive dependencies
- common problems: Where do we use it? Are we affected?



Have a detailed software inventory (e.g. SBOM)

• Reduce unnecessary dependencies

- Tool recommendations:
  - Renovate
  - OWASP Dependency Track
- Plan maintenance of your software
- Ensure fast ability of patch





#### **IDOR** OWASP **OWASP Top Ten Insecure APIs Broken Access Control** JWT Attacks Cryptographic Failures **XSS-Phishing** 3. Injection Web Race Conditions 4. Insecure Design 5. Security Misconfiguration Public S3 Buckets 6. Vulnerable and Outdated Components log4shell 7. Identification and Authentication Failures 8. Software and Data Integrity Failures **Credential** 9. Security Logging and Monitoring Failures **Stuffing** 10. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) 51 inovex

## **Identification and Authentication Failures**

User's mistakes with passwords:

- Weak passwords
- Very weak passwords
- Wrong handling of passwords
- Reuse of passwords





#### **Identification and Authentication Failures**

User's mistakes with passwords:

- Weak passwords
- Very weak passwords
- Wrong handling of passwords → Phishing Attacks
- Reuse of passwords

- → Brute Force Attacks
  try a lot of passwords for a user
- → Password Spraying try weak password for multiple users
- → Phishing Attacks trick the user to tell you the password
- → Credential Stuffing try a lot of known pairs of username/password



### **Credential Stuffing: 23andMe (2023)**

23andMe: company to explore your own genetic material

United States


# 23andMe notifies customers of data breach into its 'DNA Relatives' feature

**Breached using Credential Stuffing** 

Attackers gained access to millions of user profiles, containing name, sex, age and details about genetic ancestry

Data sets were grouped by ancestry, e.g. 1 million-user data set of Ashkenazi Jews





#### **Users:**


- Use secure passwords
- Check for breached passwords
- Use multi-factor (or passwordless) authentication

#### Devs:

- Allow multi-factor (or passwordless) authentication
- Defense in depth
  - Brute Force protection
    - CAPTCHAs
    - IP Mitigation
  - Identify leaked passwords
  - Keep usernames secret
  - Notify users about security events








**Learn from the mistakes of others** 

Consider security from the beginning and continuously

Keep up-to-date with threats and check with your attack surface



# Thank you!





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- founded in 1999
- 500+ employees
- 8 offices across Germany



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